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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 2000152-CA 
v. : 
JACOB LYMAN KENISON, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for two counts of criminal mischief, third 
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (1999), in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable William H. 
Barrett, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2)(e)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue in this case is: 
Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (1999)? A trial court's interpretation of a statute is 
reviewed for correctness with no deference accorded to the trial court's conclusions of 
law. State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1995). "This court will 'sustain a trial 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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court's evidentiary ruling on any available ground, even though it may be one not 
advanced below.'" State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1353 (Utah 1997) (citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
The recent reenactments to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (1999), determinative of 
the issue in this case, are attached at Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Jacob Lyman Kenison, was charged with two counts of criminal 
mischief (Counts I and II), two counts of burglary (Counts III and IV), and two counts of 
release of fur-bearing animals (Counts V and VI) [R. 14-16]. He pled guilty to Counts I 
and II, and the remaining charges were dismissed [R. 35-32]. The trial court sentenced 
defendant to concurrent statutory zero-to-five year terms in the Utah State Prison [R. 44-
46]. The court suspended defendant's commitment to prison and instead ordered 
defendant confined and imprisoned in the Salt Lake County Jail for nine months, after 
which defendant was to be placed on probation for thirty-six months [R. 5,44-46]. 
When defendant completed the required credits for his high school diploma, the court 
ordered his release from jail [R. 7, 65]. However, when defendant violated the reporting 
requirements of his probation, it was revoked and he was committed to the Utah State 
Prison [R. 7,79-80]. Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence [R. 83-87]. 
The motion was denied [R. 135-6]. Defendant timely appealed to this Court [R. 137]. 
2 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Factual Background - Defendant Committed Criminal Mischief 
On or about June 22, 1996, defendant trespassed onto the Beckstead Mink farm, 
belonging to Lee Beckstead and Craig Thompson, and released mink [R. 15, 36]. Also, 
on or about July 17, 1996, defendant trespassed onto the Holt Mink farm, belonging to 
Ryan Holt, and released mink [R. 16, 36]. The two farms sustained $200,000 in damage 
from the release of the mink and from vandalism to the farm [R. 16]. 
The Procedural Background - The Relevant Portion of the Statute, 
Applicable Both When Defendant Committed Criminal Mischief 
And When He Moved to Correct His Sentence, Made the Offense 
a Third Degree Felony. 
Prior to May 4, 1998, and in force at the time of the offense, Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-106 (l)(c) (Supp. 1997), provided that "[a] person commits criminal mischief if the 
person . . . intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of another." Under 
subsection (2)(c)(i) of the pre-1998 statute, a violation of subsection (l)(c) was a "felony 
of the second degree if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss 
equal to or in excess of $5,000 in value." Under subsection (2)(c)(ii), a violation of 
subsection (l)(c) was a "felony of the third degree if [it] causes or is intended to cause 
pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $1,000 but is less than $5,000 in value." 
Effective May 4,1998, section 76-6-106 was amended at subsection (2)(b) to read, 
"[a] violation of Subsection 1(b) or (c) is a class A misdemeanor" (emphasis added). 
On May 11,1998, defendant was charged in a six count information with two 
3 
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counts of criminal mischief, both second degree felonies, in violation of section 76-6-106 
[R. 14-16]. He was also charged with two counts of burglary and two counts of release of 
fur-bearing animals [R. 15]. The information, in Count I (criminal mischief), stated that 
defendant "intentionally damaged, defaced, or destroyed the property of Craig Thompson 
and Lee Beckstead, causing a pecuniary loss . . . equal to or in excess of $5,000 in value" 
[R. 14]. Count II (criminal mischief) stated that defendant "intentionally damaged, 
defaced, or destroyed the property of Ryan Holt, causing a pecuniary loss . . . equal to or 
in excess of $5,000 in value." [R. 14]. 
On October 28, 1998, defendant pled guilty to amended Counts I and II, as third 
degree felonies [R. 35]. The information was accordingly amended to read "causing a 
pecuniary loss . . . in excess of $1,000 but less than $5000." [R. 14]. The State agreed to 
dismiss the other charges [R. 38]. 
On December 7,1998, defendant was ordered to serve not more than five years in 
the Utah State Prison on each Count. The court suspended defendant's commitment to 
the Prison and instead ordered defendant confined and imprisoned in the Salt Lake 
County Jail for nine months, after which defendant was to be placed on probation for 
thirty-six months [R. 5,44-46]. 
Effective May 3,1999, the legislature excised the words "or (c)" from section 76-
6-106 (2)(b), thereby restoring the statute to precisely the same meaning it had on the date 
of the offense. 
4 
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On January 18, 2000, the court found that defendant had violated the terms of his 
probation and re-sentenced him to an indeterminate term not to exceed five years, on both 
counts [R. 79-80]. 
On January 20, 2000, defendant submitted a motion to correct an illegal sentence 
[R. 83]. Defendant asserted that "at the time the defendant was charged, the legislature 
had made the crime of criminal mischief a misdemeanor... regardless of value," and that 
based on the rule of lenity "his . . . convictions [should be] recorded as Class A 
Misdemeanors and the sentences imposed by this Court should be amended." [R. 83-87]. 
On February 9,2000, almost a year after the criminal mischief statute had been 
restored to its pre-offense form, the court denied defendant's motion [R. 135-36]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant is not entitled to the benefit of the rule of lenity and to have his sentence 
for criminal mischief imposed as a class A misdemeanor rather than a third degree felony. 
Based on the reasonable assumption that statutory amendments reflect the legislature's 
deliberate intent, the rule justly directs a trial court to impose a lesser penalty if the 
amendment has become effective before a defendant is sentenced. However, the rule of 
lenity is based on the legislature's deliberate decision to reduce the penalty of an offense. 
The legislature apparently did reduce the penalty associated with the form of 
criminal mischief defendant committed from a third degree felony to a class A 
misdemeanor in 1998, before he was sentenced. However, prior to defendant's moving to 
5 
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correct his sentence, the legislature reamended the criminal mischief statute in 1999, 
clarifying that the offense was a second degree felony. In so doing, the legislature 
expressly acknowledged that the 1998 amendment was a typographic computer error and 
that the legislature never intended to reduce the type of criminal mischief defendant 
committed to a class A misdemeanor. Because the legislature never intended the apparent 
reduction in penalty, the rule of lenity does not apply in the unique circumstances of this 
case. Consequently, allowing defendant to receive a lesser penalty for an offense the 
legislature deemed a third degree felony, both at the time he committed the offense and 
when he moved the court to correct his sentence, would result in an unwarranted windfall 
for defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE THE LEGISLATURE RESTORED THE STATUTORY 
PENALTY FOR CRIMINAL MISCHIEF TO A THIRD DEGREE 
FELONY PRIOR TO THE TIME DEFENDANT MOVED TO 
CORRECT HIS SENTENCE, THE RULE OF LENITY DOES NOT 
APPLY TO HIM 
Defendant claims that because at the time he was charged and sentenced criminal 
mischief was a class A misdemeanor, rather than a third degree felony as the statute 
formerly provided, he should have received the lesser sentence under the rule of lenity. 
Aplt.Br. 5-11. 
This argument would be unassailable if the legislature had not expressly 
recognized that reducing the particular form of criminal mischief applicable to defendant 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to a class A misdemeanor was simply a computer error. In consequence, before 
defendant moved to correct the illegal sentence, the legislature cured the error by 
reenacting the statutory language precisely as it had been before defendant was charged 
and sentenced. Because the progressive policy underlying the rule of lenity is founded on 
the reasonable assumption that statutes reflect the deliberate intent of the legislature, that 
rule has no application in the circumstances of this case. Therefore, the imposition of a 
zero-to-five term for defendant's plea to a third degree felony should be upheld. 
A. The Rule of Lenity, Founded on the Legislature's Deliberate 
Action, Does Not Apply Because the 1998 Reduction in Penalty 
For Criminal Mischief Statute was Merely an Inadvertent Error. 
/. The Rule of Lenity is Generally Applicable Because Legislative 
Enactments and Naturally Assumed to be Conscious and Deliberate. 
Relying on the rule of lenity, defendant argues that he was entitled to a class A 
misdemeanor sentence apparently in effect at the time of sentencing, rather than the third 
degree felony sentence in effect at the time he committed criminal mischief. Aplt's Br. at 
5-11. As defendant notes, see Aplt's Br. at 6-11, Utah's appellate courts have repeatedly 
applied the rule of lenity, recognizing that, in appropriate circumstances, criminal 
defendants "'are entitled to the benefit of the lesser penalty afforded by an amended 
statute made effective prior to their sentencing.'" State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 385 
(Utah App. 1997). Explaining the rationale for the rule, this Court stated: 
A legislative mitigation of the penalty for a particular crime represents a 
legislative judgment that the lesser penalty or the different treatment is 
sufficient to meet the legitimate ends of the criminal law. Nothing is to be 
7 
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gained by imposing the more severe penalty after such a pronouncement; 
the excess in punishment can, by hypothesis, serve no purpose other than to 
satisfy a desire for vengeance. 
Id. (quoting Belt v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 230, 279 P.2d 791, 793, ajfdon reh'g, 25 Utah 
380,483 P.2d 45 (1971)) (emphasis added). Thus, the most important policy behind the 
rule "'is that it is the prerogative of the legislature, expressing the will of the people, to 
fix the penalties for crimes; and the courts should give effect to the enactment and the 
effective date thereof as so declared.'" Id. (quoting State v. Tapp, 26 Utah 2d 392, 490 
P.2d 333, 336 (Utah 1971)) (emphasis added). Accordingly, in both Patience and Tapp, 
in which the penalties for the offenses at the time of commission were reduced prior to 
the defendants' sentencing, the appellate courts found that the lesser punishments should 
have been imposed. See Aplt's Br. at 9-11 (citing Tapp, 490 P.2d at 135-36; Patience, 
944P.2dat388). 
However, decisions applying the rule of lenity are based on the natural and 
reasonable assumption that legislative enactments are the fruit of conscious and deliberate 
consideration. The above-quoted language from Patience, 944 P.2d at 385 ("A 
legislative mitigation of the penalty for a particular crime represents a legislative 
judgment "), and Tapp, 490 P.2d at 336 ("expressing the will of the people"), 
supports this obvious assumption.1 Other decisions, relied on by both Patience and Tapp, 
1
 See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1672 (College Ed. 1957) (defining 
"will" as "the power of conscious and deliberate action or choice"). 
8 
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are even more explicit in recognizing the dependency of the rule on deliberate legislative 
action. In State v. Yates, 918 P.2d 136 (Utah App. 1996), this Court repeatedly 
acknowledged the purposiveness of legislative action in applying the rule of lenity: 
"A new policy having been adopted by the legislature concerning the 
punishment for the offense we are here concerned with . . . should inure to 
the defendant's benefit even though the offense had been committed . . . 
prior to the amendatory legislation." [Emphasis added.] 
"The rationale underlying the rule . . . was set forth in Belt 
Second, if the legislature finds a reduction in the penalty for a given crime 
necessary and appropriate to meet the goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, 
and removal from society, then the lesser penalty should be granted to all 
defendants sentenced subsequent to modification." [Emphasis added.] 
Id. at 138-39 (quoting Belt, 479 P.2d at 792-93).2 The Court in Yates, also stated: 
2
 Defendant also argues that his claim is supported by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
103 (1999). Aplt's Br. at 9. That section states: 
(1) The provisions of this code shall govern the construction of, the 
punishment for, and defenses against any offense defined in this code or, 
except where otherwise specifically provided or the context otherwise 
requires, any offense defined outside this code; provided such offense was 
committed after the effective date of this code. 
(2) Any offense committed prior to the effective date of this code shall be 
governed by the law, statutory and non-statutory, existing at the time of 
commission thereof, except that a defense or limitation on punishment 
available under this code shall be available to any defendant tried or 
retried after the effective date. An offense under the laws of this state 
shall be deemed to have been committed prior to the effective date of this 
act if any of the elements of the offense occurred prior thereto. 
In support, defendant relies solely on State v. Saxton, 30 Utah 456, 519 P.2d 
1340 (1974). However, in the Utah Supreme Court in Saxton applied section 76-1-103 
because the defendant correctly recognized that the pre-Code penalty for his offense, a 
third degree felony, had been superceded by the 1973 Code, which made his offense a 
9 
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"In the case of the . . . statute involved here, the legislature decided it was 
time to revise the . . . law. Legislative history reveals the amendments 
were necessary Thus, the legislature found a reduction in penalties 
appropriate, and the trial court should have sentenced [defendant] pursuant 
to that legislative mandate" [Emphasis added.] 
Id. at 139 (citing tape of House Floor Debates). See also Belt, 479 P.2d at 792 ("As to a 
mitigation of penalties, then, it is safe to assume, as the modern rule does, that it was the 
legislative design that the lighter penalty should be imposed in all cases that subsequently 
reach the courts;') (emphasis added). In In re Estrada, 408 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1965), the 
California Supreme Court stated: 
The problem . . . is . . . trying to ascertain the legislative intent did 
[sic] the [legislature intend the old or new statute to apply? 
. . . When the Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment it 
has obviously expressly determined that its former penalty was too severe 
and that a lighter punishment is proper It is an inevitable inference 
that the Legislature must have intended that the new statute imposing the 
lighter penalty... should apply. [Emphasis added.] 
class A misdemeanor at the time of sentencing. Id. at 1342. See Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-102 (1999) (the effective date of the Utah Criminal Code is July 1, 1973). Since 
defendant in this case did not commit the offense prior to the effective date of the Code, 
section 76-1-103 is irrelevant here. The State recognizes that this Court does apply 
section 76-1-103 in support of its application of the rule of lenity in Yates. See Yates, 
918 P.2d at 138. No post-1973 case involving the rule of lenity, other than Yates, has 
applied section 76-1-103. Moreoever, in view of the plain language of section 76-1-
103, the State contends that section 76-1-103 is not applicable in such a case. 
Moreover, even if section 76-1-103 were relevant, Saxton's application of the statute is 
still rooted in the rationale of Belt and Tapp. Id. at 1342 ("The 'non-statutory' law 
'existing at the time of commission' [referred to in section 76-1-103(2)] of this crime 
included the rule [of Belt and Tapp] stated above: that if the penalty for a crime is reduced 
before sentence, the defendant is entitled to the lesser penalty."). 
10 
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Id. at 951 (cited with approval in Belt, 479 P.2d at 793 n.l; Tapp, 490 P.2d at 336 n.3, 5). 
In sum, the Utah rule of lenity is plainly based only on the assumption that changes in the 
law reflect conscious legislative action. 
2. Because the Floor Debates on the Amendments to Section 76-6-106 
Show that the Legislature Never Intended to Reduce the Form of Criminal 
Mischief Committed by Defendant to a Class A Misdemeanor, Defendant 
Should Not Receive the Benefit of the Rule of Lenity. 
Application of the rule in this case would undermine the very rationale behind it. 
Defendant here committed criminal mischief in June and July of 1996. At that time, Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (l)(c) (Supp. 1997), provided that "[a] person commits criminal 
mischief if the person . . . intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of 
another" (pre-1998 statute attached at Addendum A).3 Under subsection (2)(c)(ii), a 
violation of subsection (l)(c) was a "felony of the third degree if [it] causes or is intended 
to cause pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $1,000 but is less than $5,000 in value." 
Effective May 4, 1998, section 76-6-106, was amended at subsection (2)(b) to read 
"[a] violation of Subsection 1(b) or (e) is a class A misdemeanor" (emphasis added) 
3
 Specifically, the pre-1998 statute and all of its successor reenactments identify 
four general ways in which criminal mischief may be committed at subsections (l)(a) 
(destruction of property to defraud an insurer), (l)(b) (tampering with property which 
thereby endangers human life or impairs public utility service), (l)(c) (intentional 
damage, defacement, or destruction of another's property), and (l)(d) (shooting at a 
cars, boats, trains, etc.). Subsection (2)(a) provides that a violation of subsection (l)(a) is 
a third degree felony; subsection (2)(b) provides that a violation of subsection (l)(b) is a 
class A misdemeanor. Thereafter, subsection (2)(c) provides: "Any other violation of 
this section is a [second or third degree felony, or a class A or B misdemeanor, depending 
on the amount of pecuniary loss]." [Emphasis added.] 
11 
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(attached at Addendum A).4 The amendment, along with other changes in the statute, 
was contained in House Bill 49. The second and third reading of the bill show that the 
changes to the existing law were not discussed (Transcript of Floor Debates, attached at 
Addendum B). 
On May 11, 1998, defendant was charged with, among other offenses, two counts 
of criminal mischief, "second degree felonies," in violation of section 76-6-106, for 
having "intentionally damaged, defaced, or destroyed the property [of others] " [R. 
14-16]. 
On October 28, 1998, defendant pled guilty to the two counts of criminal mischief, 
reduced to third degree felonies [R. 35]. Thus, all parties and the trial court agreed to a 
4
 Thus, under amended subsection (2)(b), all violations of subsection (l)(c) were 
penalized as class A misdemeanors and were no longer related to the extent of pecuniary 
damage caused by the actor. The hearing on defendant's motion to correct an illegal 
sentence reveals that the trial court considered the pecuniary damage caused by defendant 
in denying the motion. In contravention of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, defendant 
has failed to make either the videotape or a transcript of the hearing part of the record on 
appeal. Rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides: 
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is 
unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in 
the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. 
Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's 
deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the transcript. 
Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2). However, because the State urges a different reason for 
affirming defendant's sentence, defendant's failure to bring up the record is not crucial to 
his appeal. See Pearson, 943 P.2d at 1353 ("This court will 'sustain a trial court's 
evidentiary ruling on any available ground, even though it may be one not advanced 
below.t,f (quoting State v. RimmascK 775 P.2d 388,400 (Utah 1989)). 
12 
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plea, evidently unaware of the 1998 amendment. On December 7, 1998, in accord with 
the plea, the court sentenced defendant to a zero-to-five year term of imprisonment, part 
of which was stayed pursuant to a probation order [R. 5,44-46]. 
However, effective May 3, 1999, the legislature excised the words "or (c)" from 
section 76-6-106 (2)(b), thereby restoring the statute to precisely the same meaning it had 
on the date of the offense (current statute at Addendum A). Thus, criminal mischief 
statute again penalized "intentionally damaging], defac[ing], or destroying] the property 
of another" by reference to the pecuniary damage done by the actor. This again made 
"intentionally damaging], defacjmg], or destroy[ing] the property of another" a third 
degree felony, if it caused or was intended to cause pecuniary loss between $1,000 and 
$5,000. 
Unlike the 1998 amendment, the floor debates to the 1999 amendment plainly 
reveal that adding "or (c)" to subsection (2)(b), presumably making defendant's form of 
criminal mischief a class A misdemeanor, was a simple typographic error. The 1999 
amendment was contained in House Bill 15 (Transcript of Floor Debates attached at 
Addendum C). On the second reading of the bill, its sponsor, Bryan Holladay, stated: 
This is a very simple correction of a bill we worked on last year. No one 
knows for sure [inaudible] bill was placed back in for writing. Apparently 
there was a change [inaudible] on page two, line twenty-eight, violation of 
subsection (l)(b), and then "or (c)" was put in there. That takes that away 
from being a more serious offense and being able to assess the dollar 
amount shown on the handout that I've given you. We don't really know 
where this took place and so we think we can effectively blame the 
computers. It was never designed this way and the original law was not 
13 
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set up this way. [Emphasis added.] 
53rd Leg., H.B. 15, second reading, Jan. 19, 1999. 
The third reading of the bill again acknowledges the inadvertent, typographic 
mistake in the 1998 amendment and its correction in the 1999 amendment (attached at 
Addendum C). 
On January 20, 2000, almost a year after the legislature clarified that defendant's 
offenses were third degree felonies, defendant submitted a motion to correct an illegal 
sentence, which the trial court denied [R. 83, 135-36]. 
Thus, unlike the typical case in which a statutory amendment actually represents 
the intent of the legislature, the 1998 amendment is plainly an anomalous mistake. 
Moreover, it was a mistake at the time of defendant's sentencing, even though proof of 
that fact may have been difficult at that time. However, at this point in time, there is no 
question that the 1998 amendment was a mistake, and defendant should not be permitted 
to take advantage of a judicial rule that is plainly based on a rationale that has no 
application in the circumstances of this case. 
The rapid correction of a statute admittedly contrary to legislative intent is so 
unusual that the State has been unable to find any case with similar facts. However, in an 
analogous situation the United States Supreme Court recognized that allowing a 
defendant to take advantage of law that no longer applied to his case would result in an 
unwarranted "windfall." See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364,113 S. Ct. 838, 841 
14 
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(1993). 
In Fretwell, the defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death 
based on the jury's finding the aggravating factor that the murder, which occurred during 
a robbery, was committed for pecuniary gain. Id. 113 S. Ct. at 841. After failing in his 
direct appeal and state post-conviction proceedings, the defendant claimed on federal 
habeas corpus that his counsel was ineffective in failing to raise an objection under then-
existing precedent which prohibited the use of an aggravating factor which duplicated an 
element of the underlying offense, and the federal court of appeals upheld the reversal of 
his sentence. Id. at 841. 
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, disregarding its finding that if 
trial counsel made the objection the trial court would have sustained it and the jury would 
not have sentenced the defendant to death. Id. at 842. Considering the prejudice prong of 
defendant's ineffective assistance claim under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, (1984), the Court held a defendant must show that his 
counsel's errors are so serious as to deprive him of a trial whose result is fair or reliable, 
i.e., deprivation of a substantive or procedural right, not merely that the outcome would 
have been different. Id. The Court held that the defendant was not deprived of such right 
because at the time the federal court of appeals heard his petition, the precedent forming 
the basis of his ineffective assistance claim had been overruled. Id. at 842-44. Most 
significantly, the Court rejected the defendant's claim that "prejudice," as opposed to 
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deficient performance, should be determined at the time of trial, see id at 844, holding 
instead that prejudice is established at the time at which the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim was heard. Id. at 845 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Specifically, today we 
hold that the court making the prejudice determination may not consider the effect of an 
objection it knows to be wholly meritless under current governing law, even if the 
objection might have been considered meritorious at the time of its omission."). 
Therefore, where the result in the sentencing proceeding was not unreliable or 
fundamentally unfair as a result of a failure to make an objection, granting a reversal of 
the sentence would result in a "windfall" to which the defendant was not entitled. Id. at 
841,843. 
Similarly, a defendant's notice to a trial court that a statute reducing the penalty of 
his offense at the time of sentencing should result in his being sentenced under the more 
lenient statute. See Belt, 479 P.2d at 793. However, when the objection, i.e., the motion 
to correct an illegal sentence, is made under a statute that no longer applies and is in 
direct contradiction to the intent of the current statute, defendant is not prejudiced when 
that motion is denied. Rather, defendant would reap a "windfall" if he received the 
benefit of a mistaken law under a rule whose rationale did not apply to his case. 
The rule of lenity is a matter of mercy, not a matter of right accorded by statute.5 
See Tapp, 490 P.2d at 336 ("[A fundamental principle engrained in the law] is that to 
5
 See discussion of inapplicability of section 76-1-103, supra note 2 
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insist on the prior existing harsher penalty is a refusal to accept and keep abreast of the 
process which has been continuing over the years of ameliorating and modifying the 
treatment of antisocial behavior by changing the emphasis from vengeance and 
punishment to treatment and rehabilitation/') (footnotes omitted). In accord with the 
analysis applied in Fretwell, and given that the circumstances of defendant's case do not 
naturally appeal to a reasonable person's sense of justice and mercy, this Court should 
find that the rule of lenity does not apply in the unique circumstances of this case and that 
the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's 
conviction be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /<? day of July, 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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76-6-105 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE ( 1 9 9 9 ) 
76-6-106. Criminal mischief. 
(1) A person commits criminal mischief if the person: 
(a) under circumstances not amounting to arson, damages or destroys 
property with the intention of defrauding an insurer; 
(b) intentionally and unlawfully tampers with the property of another 
and as a result: 
(i) recklessly endangers: 
(A) human life; or 
(B) human health or safety; or 
(ii) recklessly causes or threatens a substantial interruption or 
impairment of: 
(A) any public utility service; or 
(B) any service or facility that provides communication with 
any public, private, or volunteer entity whose purpose is to 
respond to fire, police, or medical emergencies; 
(c) intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of another; 
or 
(d) recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a missile or other object at or 
against a motor vehicle, bus, airplane, boat, locomotive, train, railway car, 
or caboose, whether moving or standing. 
(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (IXa) is a felony of the third degree. 
(b) A violation of Subsection (1Kb) is a class A misdemeanor, except that 
a violation of Subsection (lXbXiXB) is a class B misdemeanor. 
(c) Any other violation of this section is a: 
(i) felony of the second degree if the actor's conduct causes or is 
intended to cause pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $5,000 in 
value; 
(ii) felony of the third degree if the actor's conduct causes or is 
intended to cause pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $1,000 but is 
less than $5,000 in value; 
(iii) class A misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is in-
tended to cause pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $300 but is less 
than $1,000 in value; and 
(iv) class B misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is in-
tended to cause pecuniary loss leas than $300 in value. 
(3) In determining the value of damages under this section, or for computer 
crimes under Section 76-6-703, the value of any computer, computer network, 
computer property, computer services, software, or data shall include the 
measurable value of the loss of use of the items and the measurable cost to 
replace or restore the items. 
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General Sess ion - 1 9 9 6 Ch. 142 
CHAPTER 142 
H. B. 264 
Passed February 27, 1996 
Approved March 12, 1996 
Effective April 29, 1996 
GRAFFITI AMENDMENTS 
Sponsor: Ron Bigelow 
AN ACT RELATING TO THE CRIMINAL 
CODE; CREATING A NEW SECTION ON 
GRAFFITI; INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR 
REMOVAL COSTS OF GRAFFITI; AND 
PROVIDING FOR THE VOLUNTARY 
REMOVAL OF GRAFFITI BY THE 
RESPONSIBLE PERSON. 
This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 
1953 as follows: 
AMENDS: 
76-6-106, as last amended by Chapter 291, Laws of 
Utah 1995 
76-6-206, as last amended by Chapter 14, Laws of 
Utah 1992 
78-11-20, as last amended by Chapter 1, Laws of 
Utah 1996 
78-11-20.7, as last amended by Chapter 1, Laws of 
Utah 1996 
ENACTS: 
76-6-107, Utah Code Annotated 1963 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section 76-4-106 la amended to 
read: 
76-6-106. Criminal miachiet 
(1) A person commits criminal mischief if the 
person: 
(a) under circumstances not amounting to arson, 
damages or destroys property with the intention of 
defrauding an insurer, 
(b) intentionally and unlawfully tampers with 
the property of another and thereby: 
(i) recklessly endangers human life; or 
(ii) recklessly causes or threatens a substantial 
interruption or impairment of any public utility 
service; 
(c) intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys 
the property of another!, including the use ef graffiti 
as defined in Subsection 78-11 20(2)]; or 
(d) recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a 
missile or other object at or against a motor vehicle, 
bus, airplane, boat, locomotive, train, railway car, or 
caboose, whether moving or standing. 
(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (IXa) is a felony of 
the third degree. 
(b) A violation of Subsection (1Kb) is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(c) Any other violation of this section is a: 
(i) felony of the second degree if the actor's 
conduct causes or is intended to cause pecuniary 
loss equal to or in excess of $5,000 in value; 
(ii) felony of the third degree if the actor's conduct 
causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss equal 
to or in excess of $1,000 but is less than $5,000 in 
value; 
(iii) class A misdemeanor if the actor's conduct 
causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss equal 
to or in excess of $300 but is less than $1,000 in 
value; and 
(iv) class B misdemeanor if the actor's conduct 
causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss less 
than $300 in value. 
Section 2. Section 76-6-107 is enacted to 
read: 
76-6-107. Graffiti defined — Penalties — 
Removal costs — Reimbursement liability. 
(1) "Graffiti" means any form of unauthorized 
printing, writing, spraying, scratching, affixing, or 
inscribing on the property of another regardless of 
the content or nature of the material used in the 
commission of the act 
(2) "Victim* means the person or entity whose 
property was defaced by the graffiti and bears the 
expense for its removal 
(3) Graffiti is a: 
(a) second degree felony if the damage caused is in 
excess of 15,000; 
felony if the damage caused is in degree (b) third 
excess of $1,' 
(c) class A misdemeanor if the damage caused is 
equal to or in excess of 1300; and 
(d) class B misdemeanor if the damage caused is 
less than $300. 
(4) Damages under Subsection (3) include 
removal costs, repair costs, or replacement costs, 
whichever is less. 
(5) The court, upon conviction or adjudication, 
shall order restitution to the victim in the amount of 
removal, repair, or replacement costs. 
(6) An additional amount of $1,000 in restitution 
shall be added to removal costs if the graffiti is 
positioned on an overpass or an underpass, requires 
that traffic be interfered with in order to remove it, 
or the entity responsible for the area in which the 
clean-Hip is to take place must provide assistance in 
order for the removal to take place safely. 
(7) A person who voluntarily and at his own 
expense, removes graffiti for which he l i 
responsible may be credited for the removal costs 
against restitution ordered by a court. 
Section 3. Section 76-6-206 is amended to 
read: 
76-6-206. Criminal trespass. 
(1) For purposes of this section "enter" means 
intrusion of the entire body. 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under 
circumstances not amounting to burglary as 
defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 
76-6-204: 
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General 
CHAPTER 25 
H. B. 49 
Passed February 11, 1998 
Approved March 2, 1998 
Effective May 4, 1998 
EMERGENCY SERVICES AMENDMENTS 
Sponsor: Bryan D. Holladay 
H ACT RELATING TO THE CRIMINAL 
COVEl AMENDING THE OFFENSES OF 
CRIMINAL MISCHIEF AND EMERGENCY 
TELEPHONE ABUSE AS THEY RELATE TO 
^ P O R T I N G OF EMERGENCIES; 
CHEATING THE OFFENSE OF DAMAGING 
0 H INTERRUPTING A COMMUNICATION 
DEVICE USED TO REPORT AN 
EMERGENCY; AND PROVIDING 
CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR THE 
OFFENSE. 
This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 
1953 as follows: 
AMENDS* 
76-6-106, as last amended by Chapter 300, Laws of 
Utah 1997 
76*9-202, as enacted by Chapter 196, Laws of Utah 
1973 
ENACTS* 
76-6-108, Utah Code Annotated 1953 
gt U enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section 76-6-106 i* amended to 
read* 
76-6-106. Criminal mischief. 
(1) A person commits criminal mischief if the 
person: 
(a) under circumstances not amounting to arson, 
damages or destroys property with the intention of 
defrauding an insurer, 
(b) intentionally and unlawfully tampers with 
the property of another and [thesebyi (i)] as a result: 
(i) recklessly endangers: 
(A) human life; or 
(B) human health or safety, or 
(ii) recklessly causes or threatens a substantial 
interruption or impairment of: 
(A) any public utility service; or 
(B) any service or facility that provides 
communication with any public, private, or 
vo unteer entity whose purpose is to respond to fire, 
Police, or medical emergencies; 
(c) intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys 
lhs property of another, or 
(to recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a 
missile or other object at or against a motor vehicle, 
US
 f"^a n e» k°a*» locomotive, train, railway car, 
or cab
°ose, whether moving or standing. 
- 1998 Ch. 25 
(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a felony of 
the third degree. 
(b) A violation of Subsection (1Kb) or (c) is a class 
A misdemeanor, except that a violation of 
Subsection (l)(b)(i)(B) is a class B misdemeanor. 
(c) Any other violation of this section is a: 
(i) felony of the second degree if the actor's 
conduct causes or is intended to cause pecuniary 
loss equal to or in excess of $5,000 in value; 
(ii) felony of the third degree if the actor's conduct 
causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss equal 
to or in excess of $1,000 but is less than $5,000 in 
value; 
(in) class A misdemeanor if the actor's conduct 
causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss equal 
to or in excess of $300 but is less than $1,000 in 
value; and 
(iv) class B misdemeanor if the actor's conduct 
causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss less 
than $300 in value. 
(3) In determining the value of damages under 
this section, or for computer crimes under Section 
76-6-703, the value of any computer, computer 
network, computer property, computer services, 
software, or data shall include the measurable 
value of the lose of use of such items and the 
measurable cost to replace or restore such items. 
Section 2. Section 76-6-108 is enacted to 
readi 
76-6-10& Damage to or interruption of a 
communication device. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Communication device" means any device, 
including a telephone, cellular telephone, 
computer, or radio, which may be used in an 
attempt to summon police, fire, medical, or other 
emergency aid. 
(b) "Emergency means any situation in which; 
(j) property or human health or safety is in 
jeopardy; ana 
(n) the prompt summoning of aid is essential to 
the preservation of the property or human safety or 
heaitju 
(2) A person is guilty of damage to or interruption 
of a7communication device if the actor attemptsTo 
prohibit or interrupt, or prohibits or interrupts, 
another person's use of communication equipment 
when the other person is attempting to summon 
emergency aid or has communicated a desire To 
summon emergency aid, and in the process the 
actor. 
(a) uses force, intimidation, or ariy other form of 
violence; "~ 
(b) destroys, disables, or damages 
communication equipment; or 
(c) commits any other act in an attempt to 
prohibit or interrupt the person's use of ""a 
communication device to summon emergency aid. 
13S 
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IRANhLKlPi uh FL^Uh Pl-BA I L 
Second Keadn^ , \ House Bill 49: Januur . " ^ 
ib2 L a w Enforcement & Criming :ustice standing L omii;;:i:e 
SPEAKER: Represent. - < Biii 49. 
U UI j . ; \ 11 \ \ . : r A . . hairnlan (inaudible]. House Bill 49 was originally 
.* ^rk-J ai i 5'jrth IUM lo kind of clarify some issues with 911. I think 
mosi ot us ha\ c always thought or believed that if you dial 911 and tie up 
the lines .and do it in a malicious manner, and messing around or whatever, 
that it's a fairly heavy penalty. This actually helps to clarify some of those 
circumstances under which that would be the case. We would also now 
add a couple of items as it relates to other crimes. For example if a person 
is committing domestic violence, this would enable the prosecutors 
[inaudible] police officers [inaudible] to have a little bit more power in 
prosecuting and in bargaining with a perpetrator in regards to also having 
that penalty keeping someone from making emergency phone calls. It's 
interesting to note [inaudible] received a sheet that shows some of the 
needs for this bill. Currently it is a crime to threaten the interruption or 
[inaudible] of a public utility service but not actually a line or [inaudible]. 
What this legislation does is it makes it a class A misdemeanor to disrupt 
an emergency services facility by tampering with the property of someone 
else. Also it makes it a class B misdemeanor [inaudible] or to falsely 
report an emergency knowing that one does not exist, and three, to tamper 
with the property of another resulting in recklessly endangering human 
health and safety. For example, if you [inaudible] and then someone was 
not able to make a call [inaudible]. The people who support this 
legislation are the Attorney General's Office, the Statewide Association of 
Public Attorneys, and as far as I can determine the police officers do too. 
In fact I really don't want to go into too much detail. I think I've kind of 
capsulized what it does and I would be open to questions. 
Various questions 
SPEAKER: Motion carries unanimously. 
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Third Reading of House Bill 49: January 28. 1998 
52 Leg., Day 10, Side 1, Counter No. 687 
SPEAKER: [inaudible] consideration of bills on our consent calender. 
CLERK: House Bill 49; Emergency Services Amendments; Brian D. Holladay. 
Committee vote: 8 Yes; 0 No; 3 Absent. 
SPEAKER: Representative Holladay. 
HOLLADAY: Thank you Mr. Speaker. We voted on this bill once before but by mistake 
it was on the calender a little bit too soon. This just essentially puts 
interruption of 911 services for a commission of a crime, domestic 
violence, or even for malicious mischief, gives it a little more definition, 
and more of a defined crime. I would urge your support. 
SPEAKER: Thank you. Voting is open on House Bill 49. 
SPEAKER: Seeing all present, having voted [inaudible] we'll close the vote. House 
Bill 49 averaging 68 Yes votes and 0 No votes passes this body and we 
forward it to the Senate for their consideration. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Second Reading mi u ^ c iiill 15 January 19, 1999 
House Judicial'} < on m MIL ./ 
; \ U A Y . 1 hank you Mr. Chairman. 1 his is a ver> simple correction ot a bill 
we worked on last year. No one knows for sure [inaudible] bill was 
placed back in for writing. Apparently there was a change 
[inaudible] on page two, line twenty-eight, violation of subseciu'* 
(1 )(b), and then "or (c f was put in there, 1 hat takes that awa\ ! 
being a more serious offense and being able to assess the dollar 
amount shown on the handout that I've given you. We don't really 
know where this took place and so we think we can effective!} 
blame the computers. It was never designed this wa\ and the 
original law was not set up this way. It has the potential of really 
limiting the amount of punishment a person can recei\e for a very 
serious [inaudible] of the criminal mischief code. So it doesn't really 
change anything, nor does it change the intent of an> thing that was 
done before With that Tin open to clarifying questions or whatever 
you want. 
Third Reading of House Bill 15: January 26, iy99 
53 Leg., Day 5, Side 1, Counter No 828 
CLERK: House Bill 1 \ Criminal Mischief Amendments; Brian D, I lolladay. 
Judiciary ('ommittee vote: 7 Yes; 0 No; 4 Absent. 
km
 h FR: RepresentativeHolladay. 
HOLLADAY: Thank you Mr. Speakci. 1 louse Bill 15 was reall} just a mistake in 
the numbering of a bill li made certain criminal penalties just a 
class A misdemeanor. 1 he Attorney General's Office doesn't want 
to take credit for it We're not going to blame our legislative staff. 
It's not m> fault. We're just going to blame the computers. But it 
was a glitch in the system, and it's a good bill. Please vote for it. 
SPEAKER: Thank \ on Representative Holladay. Voting is now open on House 
Bill is" 
SPEAKER: Seeing all present having voted, voting will be closeu. House Bill 15 
having received 67 Yes votes and 0 No votes, passes from this body 
and will be referred to the Senate for further action. 
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